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The institutions and processes of American political life are more 
the subjects of controversy today than at any time since the reformist 
decades 1900-1920.1 Very frequently political parties are the institutions 
singled out for special attention by the critics; and whether the discus-
sants are practicing politicians, members of the electorate or academi-
cians, invariably they are concerned with party cohesiveness and respon-
sibility. Should our parties develop programs, operate the government 
(or criticize it) in accordance with those policies and be accountable as 
a whole to the electorate? Or should they continue to be rather loose 
coalitions that amass majority support for the regime and promote 
candidates for public office?2 In this discussion at least two points should 
be recalled: First, that in the event of a liberal-conservative realign-
ment the party of the Right would have little chance for national 
success. Second, that American political parties are not so incohesive 
as some of their critics might suggest.3 
Like many controversies, the present issue of party cohesion and 
discipline can be illuminated in the light of historical experience. We 
believe that, by contrasting two Congresses from the turn of the century 
and by comparing the attitudes toward party discipline of two particular 
members of those Congresses, it will be possible to suggest a typology of 
party behavior. This model can, in turn, re-focus discussions about the 
American national political arena and guide inquiry into political party 
systems in general. The two men who have been selected for special 
scrutiny are William Jennings Bryan and George W. Norris. In addition 
to their attitudes as expressed orally and in written form, their views of 
party will be inferred from the record of roll-call votes that they left 
behind as freshman members of the United States House of Repre-
sentatives. 
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The history of the House of Representatives suggests that occasion-
ally considerable party discipline can occur in American politics—at 
least in that body and given certain preconditions. Both high and low 
degrees of party cohesion are to be found in the voting records of the 
House near the turn of the last century. 
The Fifty-second (1891-93) and Fifty-eighth (1903-05) Congresses 
provide a contrast in party cohesion. Party discipline was minimal in 
the Fifty-second Congress, particularly on the majority (Democratic) 
side of the aisle; it was notably high in the Fifty-eighth—and {particu-
larly so on the majority (Republican) side. These differences in central 
tendency probably result from a number of causes. A contributing factor 
probably was that the earlier Congress was organized by the Democratic 
Party at a time when low legislative cohesion was fashionable politically. 
Strong party discipline had come to be the norm twelve years later, 
however, when the Republicans were ascendant in the House. That the 
majority party also held the Presidency in 1903 but not in 1891 would 
be a second influence. The creation of the office of party whip in 1897 
must have made some additional contribution to the difference. The 
issues of the times had an impact upon cohesion, as did the different 
professional skills of the two Speakers of the House, Charles F. Crisp 
(D.-Ga.) and Joseph G. Cannon (R.-Ill.). Crisp met with such frustra-
tion that he resigned from the House to run for the Senate.4 In contrast, 
Cannon was eminently successful at coalition building—indeed, too suc-
cessful—and his high-handed methods of dealing with the Insurgents 
in his own party led to his downfall in 1910. "Uncle Joe" was beaten 
then only by what he regarded as deviousness; and even the strongest 
supporters of the Insurgent leader of that later date and one of the 
subjects of this study, Norris, would concede that Cannonism was 
defeated only through good fortune and consummate political skill.5 
The disciplined, programmatic party that interests some Americans was 
not exemplified by Cannon's Fifty-eighth Congress; and neither was the 
Fifty-second Congress the best alternative to disciplined party action. 
In fact, both of them seem to have been pathological conditions of 
legislative partisanship. Either too little or too much direction was 
supplied by the Speaker and his organization. 
ii 
The roster of members of the Fifty-second and Fifty-eighth Con-
gresses, respectively, included William Jennings Bryan and George W. 
Norris. Their selection for special attention here is owing partly to 
their compatible views on public policies and to their similar constitu-
encies (probably they are the best known historical political figures to 
have come out of the state of Nebraska). But they have been selected 
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also because they approximate archetypes of the two poles of the party 
discipline and cohesion issues. Despite their national reputations both 
suffered numerous disappointments within their parties; yet Bryan 
stayed within the Democratic organization while Norris left the G.O.P. 
after years of intra-party discontent. Both belonged to the more liberal 
wings of their parties; both were relative newcomers to the districts that 
they represented as freshmen members in Washington. Bryan was only 
one year older than Norris and their active careers in national politics 
coincided for twenty-three years. Neither had prior legislative experi-
ence before entering the House of Representatives. Both were elected 
from "unsafe" districts, and both entered upon a congressional career 
as strong supporters of their parties. 
Their subsequent paths as partisans within their parties diverged, 
however. Although falling from a position of influence in the Demo-
cratic Party after 1915, Bryan was unfailing in his enthusiasm for what 
party might accomplish. He was not adamant that one must adhere 
always to his party, yet he favored regularity wherever possible.6 Norris 
was of the opposite view. Eventually he left the Republicans. Still, he 
refused to join with the Democracy (with which he was ideologically 
compatible), for it was regarded as being further from salvation than 
the party he had just abandoned. The extent of Norris' beliefs became 
apparent from his advocacy of the "non-partisan party" in 1913—a full 
twenty-nine years before he was defeated for re-election to the Senate 
in 1942.7 
Bryan was not uncomfortable during his two terms in the House. He 
was concerned with higher office, and probably looked upon his four 
years in Washington as a period of apprenticeship. He was selected to 
the influential Committee on Ways and Means as a result of an agreement 
between Speaker Crisp and Rep. William Springer (D.-I1L), an old 
friend whom Bryan had supported for the Speakership but who was 
persuaded to withdraw his candidacy for the office. Bryan joined those 
Southern and Western Democratic members who ignored party lines on 
tariff and monetary issues. Although Werner went too far in crediting 
Rep. Joseph W. Bailey (D.-Tex.) with introducing him to the im-
portance of bimetallism,8 the Nebraskan did develop greater interest 
in the issue when his district was altered to increase the number of 
debtor farm voters in the 1892 election. It has been said that Bryan 
saw politics as a struggle between good and evil,9 and certainly he was 
a moralizer on many social issues. But unlike many who are convinced 
of the rightness of their ideas, he was willing to support a platform or 
candidate in the short run in exchange for the subsequent support of 
the party when his views might prevail in the future. He supported 
Alton B. Parker in 1904, and supported the Democratic Party even when 
it selected Wall Street lawyer John W. Davis as its Presidential nominee 
in 1924.10 This hope of greater gain through party solidarity typifies 
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the thinking of the party responsibility theorists; and because Bryan and 
his policies were influential in the Democratic Party for two decades, his 
philosophy was tested in actual political confrontation. 
The experiences of George Norris as a freshman member of the 
House contrasted with those of Bryan twelve years before. Norris 
changed from extreme partisan to party critic during his first three to 
five years in the chamber. He had been supported for district judge in 
1895 by Republican creditor interests against a Populist incumbent, and 
later he said that he was as bitter a partisan as any at that time.11 He 
was on good terms with Speaker Cannon and the Party during his first 
term, although he broke party ranks only a few weeks after taking his 
seat. A Democrat had moved to recess the House for Washington's 
birthday and the Republican members opposed the motion en masse, in 
keeping with the strong party discipline of the time. Norris liked the 
motion on its merits, however, and the Democrats were surprised to find 
him among them on a teller vote. After receiving a severe upbraiding 
from his Republican colleagues for crossing the aisle, the freshman 
member was downcast until he happened past the Senate wing on Feb-
ruary 22. There a motion to recess for the national holiday had been 
brought by a Republican rather than by a member of the minority; it 
had passed, and the Senate chamber was vacant. Norris was embittered 
by this first of many instances of what seemed to be the influence of 
whim and of partisanship for its own sake over the true principles of 
Republicanism as he understood them.12 It seems significant that he 
maintained his quarrels to be with the system of partisanship itself and 
not with the men through whom it operated.13 He was elected to the 
Senate in 1913. There he opposed American entry into World War I, 
associated himself with numerous Democratic programs during the 
'Twenties and 'Thirties, and achieved notice in the South as the father 
of the Tennessee Valley Authority. Still, he refused to cross the aisle in 
1936 when he declared himself to be henceforth an Independent. Just 
as the party loyalty of Bryan contrasts with that of Eugene McCarthy 
in 1968, so does the political independence of Norris after 1936 contrast 
with the willingness of Sen. Wayne Morse (R., I., D.-Ore.) to affiliate 
himself with his former opponents. 
iii 
A more systematic comparison of the degrees of partisanship seen by 
Bryan and Norris as first-term congressmen can be made through roll-
call analysis. The twenty-five most significant roll-call votes in which 
each man participated as freshmen members can be examined, with 
"significance" defined empirically as highest when (1) all members of 
the House are present and voting, and (2) the outcome of that vote is 
decided by a single aye or nay. Moreover, these twenty-five roll calls have 
been selected from areas of policy that are as nearly distinct as possible.14 
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The statistical measure of roll-call significance was devised by William Riker. 
Significance is highest when all members are present and voting and the outcome 
I is decided by a single vote, and lowest when a bare quorum participate and all 
voters are on the same side. In the 435-member modern Congress, significance is 
j highest for an outcome of 218 to 217 (or vice-versa) and lowest at 218 to 0. 
The formula for computing the coefficient is 
S
 = n - q - m + 2 + " " * + * 
1
 ~ ^ n — t + 2 
where n is the number of members of the voting body (Congress), q is the number 
on the losing side in the roll call under study, m is the minimum number of votes 
necessary for victory when r voters participate, r is the number voting on the roll 
call being studied, and t is the number needed for a quorum. Riker, "A Method 
I for Determining the Significance of Roll Calls in Voting Bodies/' in John C. 
Wahlke and Heinz Eulau, eds., Legislative Behavior: A Reader in Theory and 
Research (Glencoe, 111., 1959), 379-380, cited in Lee F. Anderson, Meredith W. 
Watts, Jr. and Allen R. Wilcox, Legislative Roll-Call Analysis (Evanston, 111., 
1966), 82-83. 
A preliminary judgment of the importance of party membership, 
regionalism, tenure and other variables can be suggested statistically. 
Party membership was determined to be a statistically significant variable 
by the chi-square test at the .01 level in twenty-two of the roll-call votes 
of the Fifty-second Congress and in twenty-four of the roll calls in the 
Fifty-eighth. Sectionalism was statistically significant only twelve times 
in the Bryan Congress, however, and fourteen times during Noms' 
initial term of office. Tenure in office was a significant predictor of 
voting but three times in both Congresses. Applying this type of stan-
dard, it seems clear that party affiliation was the leading determinant 
of voting on these selected roll calls even in the period 1891-93.15 
The chi-square test of significance has been used here. Chi-square compares 
outcomes that have been determined empirically with what would have been 
expected to occur by random chance or under certain theoretical assumptions. 
The difference between expectation and reality is compared with any of the 
standard tables of chi-square values. The statistic is described in most elementary 
texts on quantitative methods. See Hubert M. Blalock, Social Statistics (New York, 
1960), 212-221. 
A closer analysis of partisanship per se is obtained by comparing the 
Rice Indexes of Cohesion of the two parties in each Congress. In the 
Fifty-second Congress the Democratic majority was less cohesive than 
the Republican members on twenty-two of the twenty-five occasions. 
Because both parties were unanimous on two roll calls, this means that 
the majority party in the House was more cohesive on only one of the 
twenty-five selected votes—and that was on a motion to allow Sunday 
memorial services for those congressmen who might pass away during 
the coming session. The mean indexes of cohesion during the Fifty-
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second Congress were .31 for the Democrats and .72 for the G.O.P. A 
sharp contrast had occurred by the time that Norris entered the House— 
especially in the cohesion of the Democrats. The Republican Party had 
a greater central tendency on only fifteen occasions; and the mean 
cohesion of the indexes had increased to .81 for the Democrats and 
.86 for the majority-party Republicans. The discipline being imposed 
on both sides of the aisle was far stronger in 1903-04 than it had been 
when Bryan was a member of the House. 
The Rice index is simply the difference between the percentage of a party's 
members who are on one side of a vote and the percentage on the other. It is 
found through an ordinary subtraction operation. Party unanimity yields as index 
of 1.00 (100 percent less 0 percent). There would seem to be an absence of party 
cohesion if half of the members were on either side of an issue, in which case the 
index would be .00 (50 percent minus 50 percent); three-fourths on one side and 
one quarter on the other yields .50 (75 percent less 25 percent), and so on. Stuart 
Rice argued that these indexes may be compared more conveniently than per-
centages. Rice, Quantitative Methods in Politics (New York, 1928), 209. 
How loyal were Bryan and Norris to their own parties? Norris 
seems to be the greater partisan by one measure, for he voted differently 
from the majority of his party only three times out of twenty-five, while 
Bryan differed on seven roll calls. But Democratic organization under 
Speaker Crisp was so loose that despite his seven defections Bryan's party 
loyalty was greater than that of sixty-five percent of his party colleagues. 
Notwithstanding his loyalty on twenty-two occasions, however, Norris 
ranked below seventy-seven percent of the Republican members of the 
Fifty-eighth Congress in this respect. It must have seemed ironic to 
Norris that despite his efforts to vote with his party so frequently he 
still came to be accused of disloyalty. Bryan, on the other hand, may 
have seen the ineffectiveness of his own party as being related to its low 
level of cohesion. 
The significance of sectionalism warrants comparing the votes of 
Bryan and Norris with those of congressmen from both major parties in 
each of eight regions of the country. Only members who participated 
on thirteen or more roll calls have been analyzed.16 The table below pre-
sents, by party and region, the average number of votes cast identically 
with one of the two subjects by relevant congressmen. The fourteen New 
England Democrats, for example, among themselves cast a total of 112 
votes identical to positions taken by Bryan. The highest possible num-
ber of identical votes would have been (14 X 25), or 350. Dividing 112 
by 14, the mean number of identical votes from that region is 8.0. 
Merriam's observation is verified that Bryan represented the West 
(North Central and East Central) and South (Solid South and Border), 
against the North and East (New England and Middle Atlantic)17— 
especially within his own party. The only aberration from this general-
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average number of identical votes, 
region, on twenty-five 
Fift) 
New England (Conn., Me., Mass., 
N.H., R.I., Vt.) 
Mid Atlantic (Del., N.J., N.Y., 
Pa.) 
East North Central (111., Ind., 
Mich., O., Wise.) 
*West North Central (la., Kans., 
Minn., Mo., Nebr., N.D., S.D.) 
Solid South (Ala., Ark., Fla., Ga., 
La., Miss., N.C., S.C., Tex., Va.) 
Border States (Ky., Md., 
Okla., Tenn., W. Va.) 
Mountain States (Calif., 
Ore., Wash.) 
Western States 
* Denotes the region in which the 
Bryan's votes were most like the votes 
selected 
-second Cong. (Bryan) 
Dems. 
8.0 
(N=14) 
7.6 
(N—34) 
12.7 
(N=50) 
13.7 
(N=2I ) 
12.9 
(N=69) 
10.3 
(N=26) 
<N= 0) 
9.0 
<N= 2) 
Reps. 
5.5 
<N= 8) 
5.1 
(N=23) 
5.7 
(N=18) 
7.4 
( N = l l ) 
( N = 0) 
3.0 
( N = 2) 
6.3 
( N = 4) 
7.0 
<N= 3) 
by party and 
roll calls 
Fifty-eighth Cong. (Norris) | 
Dems. 
3~0 
( N = 6) 
3.4 
(N=17) 
4.6 
( N - 1 0 ) 
3.8 
( N - 1 6 ) 
3.4 
(N—70) 
3.4 
(N=15) 
3.0 
( N = 1) 
5.0 
( N = 2) 
constituencies of Bryan and Norris 
cast by others from h 
anticipated from the writing of Charles Merriam, his voting 
the behavior of congressmen from the 
Norris also voted most similarly with 
graphical allies came from the Western 
Solid South or East 
those from his own 
and Mountain areas. 
is own region. 
Reps. 
15.3 
(N=21) 
15.4 
(N—42) 
15.7 
(N—51) 
17.5 
(N—33) 
13.0 
( N = 1) 
12.5 
( N = 6) 
16.4 
( N = 7) 
17.1 
<N= 9) 
were located. 
As might be I 
was not too dissimilar from | 
North Central 
region, but his 
areas either. 1 
closest geo- 1 
ization would be the Pacific Coast region; but this may be because there 
were only two congressmen from that area who were Democrats. His 
views appear similar to those of Republican congressmen from the North 
Central, Pacific Coast and Mountain regions, and this is not to be 
unexpected. Norris received more supporting votes from his own party 
and fewer from the opposition than had Bryan, reflecting the increased 
party discipline of the Fifty-eighth Congress. A similar affinity between 
the votes of Norris and those of Republican members from his own 
region and from the Mountain and Pacific states was manifested. 
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The preceding considerations indicate that there is more than a 
single dimension by which to evaluate party performance. The familiar 
one, of course, is cohesion. Degrees of cohesion range from unanimity to 
complete absence of central tendency, and either of these extremes can 
yield creditable or unacceptable legislative performances. A second 
dimension might entail normative cognitions of the worth of the parti-
sanship encountered in political life. There can be an "ideal" situation 
from which rational decisions emerge about public policy, or a "patho-
logical" condition as well—the rebellious condition of the Democratic 
Party under Crisp or the dominated nature of both parties during 
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the Cannon period. A typology can be constructed from these two 
dimensions. 
C 
o 
h 
e
 Undisciplined 
s 
i 
o Disciplined 
n 
The normative evaluation of "ideal" relates to what Fenton has 
characterized as an issue-oriented two-party politics, while the more tra-
ditional job-oriented patterns of partisanship are represented as pathol-
ogies. Under the latter type the emphasis is upon securing elective and 
appointive office rather than upon emphasizing choices of programs, 
issues and policies.18 
We suggest that both Bryan and Norris had their congressional ex-
perience in parties of the pathological type. Bryan was concerned about 
the ineffectiveness of his group and wondered about the inability of so 
divisive a majority to function effectively. Norris eventually questioned 
the worth of a party dominated by a Speaker of great power and by an 
establishment whose ideas often bore little relationship to his concep-
tions of Republicanism. By 1908 he was a leader of those who were 
moving to cure that pathological condition. For both Bryan and Norris 
the remedy was to move diagonally across the fourfold typology. The 
former sought a cure by moving from "insurrectional" to "program-
matic" party action. Norris was hardened against party, and advanced 
the non-partisan party as a hope of increasing the "deliberative character 
of national policy-making." He hoped to move across the other diagonal. 
Recently Robert Golembiewski and his associates have commented 
on the need for conceptual models in the study of political parties,19 and 
we suggest that this four-fold typology can be useful in that task. Either 
in an historical or contemporary context, party cohesion can be appraised 
by roll-call analysis as in the present study. Making the normative eval-
uation is more problematic, although a panel of informed judges might 
supply useful indicators of this second dimension. Again, the continuing 
party-bolting of a well-defined core of insurgents may suggest that per-
sonality, rather than policy, is the basis for dissension. 
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